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Abstract
Classic pragmatism laid the foundations for a practice-based notion of citizenship that 
views democracy as a fragile accomplishment in need of constant self-actualisation. 
This article revisits this heritage to explore different notions of pluralism and demo-
cratic participation developed over the last century. Drawing on James and Dewey, 
the article interrogates how different understandings of democracy deal with plural-
ism and the meaning of democratic life. The focus is on three prominent models in 
contemporary democratic theory and practice, namely: representative, participatory 
and deliberative. The purpose is to review different ways of thinking and enacting citi-
zen participation and explore key distinctions, overlaps and productive tensions. The 
conclusion argues that a vibrant democratic ecology requires combining the practices 
that underpin these models in order to develop deeper, and more sustainable, forms of 
citizenship and democratic life.
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 Introduction
The old saying that the cure for the ills of democracy is more democ-
racy is no apt if it means … introducing more machinery of the same 
kind … But the phrase may also indicate the need of returning to the 
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idea itself, of clarifying and deepening our apprehension of it, and of 
employing our sense of its meaning to criticize and remake its political 
manifestations.
john dewey (1984, p. 325)
The current spread of democracy around the world is unprecedented, and 
so is the level of civic aspiration, expectation and discontent with current 
 institutional practices and notions of citizenship (Dalton, 2004; Norris, 2002, 
2011). Democracy is an idea that has been continuously constructed, contested, 
fought over, implemented and revised (Saward, 2003, p. viii). This article out-
lines different notions of pluralism and democratic participation developed 
over the last century. The purpose is to explore three different ways of think-
ing and enacting democracy, including key distinctions, areas of overlap and 
productive tensions. In particular, the article analyses the participatory and 
deliberative turns in democratic theory and practice, and draws on the work of 
classic pragmatists William James and John Dewey in order to unpack alterna-
tive forms of pluralism and democratic participation.
James’ pluralism recognises that natural and social worlds are multiple, 
 diverse and evolving, and is suspicious of attempts to represent them as uni-
tary or absolute (Bernstein, 2010, pp. 53–69). His pluralism, therefore, was not 
merely descriptive but entailed ethical concerns regarding how to deal with 
the plurality of worlds and beings. He was particularly critical of “the blindness 
with which we are all afflicted in regard to the feelings of creatures and people 
different from ourselves” (James, 1997, p. 629). Pluralist political theory after 
James has approached moral, ethical and cultural pluralism as “an empirical, 
political reality”, and “has imagined numerous paths toward the development 
of an acceptance of varied values, cultures, and ways of life” (Schlosberg, 2008, 
p. 142). Many of those paths have been grounded on alternative views of what 
democratic participation could and should look like.
Dewey was a pioneer in questioning orthodox understandings of democ-
racy and thus refused to reduce its meaning to a political system or a form of 
government (Dewey, 1916, p. 1419). Instead, he proposed thinking about democ-
racy as “a way of life” (Dewey, 1937, p. 457), and this invited profound questions 
about the role of citizens and communities in democratic participation (see 
Dewey, 1927). Therefore, following James and Dewey, I will interrogate how 
different understandings of democracy deal with pluralism and the meaning 
of democratic life. To do so, I explore three models that have become promi-
nent in contemporary democratic theory and practice, namely: representative, 
 participatory and deliberative.
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These models are not mutually exclusive and overlap in contemporary practice. 
There is also a chronological dimension to their evolution, and indeed they 
partly emerged in response to previous models. The key differences between 
them are their emphases, assumptions and aspirations with regard to demo-
cratic life. This article is structured according to a framework designed to tease 
out key distinctions. Accordingly, for each model, I will explore the following 
dimensions (summarised in Table 1 and unpacked in subsequent sections):
• The notion of democratic participation that underpins each model. That is, 
what does it mean to participate in democracy?
• How is pluralism understood and addressed, and how does this shape dem-
ocratic participation?
Table 1 Three (overlapping) models of democracy
Representative 
democracy
Participatory 
democracy
Deliberative 
democracy
Notion of 
democratic 
participation
Voting in elections 
to choose between 
competing elites
Taking part in 
 collective action 
and decision-
making in civic 
and/or official 
spheres
Engaging in 
 deliberation about 
public issues and 
policies
Notion of pluralism Aggregative / 
competitive
Engaged / critical Discursive / 
consensual
How are publics 
made?
By aggregating 
individual 
preferences 
through electoral 
contests and 
interest groups
Through processes 
of collective 
association, 
collaboration, 
struggle and civic 
education
Through public 
deliberation 
that transforms 
individual 
preferences into 
public reasons
What kind of 
citizen are citizens 
invited to be?
Occasional voter; 
member of interest 
group
Ongoing 
participant in 
civic and official 
processes
Considered 
deliberator
Examples of 
institutional 
mechanisms
Elections Participatory 
Budgeting
Mini-publics
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• How are publics constructed? Publics and communities are not simply pre-
existing entities, but get made through the ways in which they are imagined, 
summoned, assembled and mobilised (Barnett, 2008).
• The role of citizens. Different understandings of democracy imply different 
assumptions about citizenship, and shape the opportunities that people get 
to participate. Therefore, for each model, I will ask: What kind of citizen are 
citizens invited to be?
• Institutional mechanisms. The emblematic mechanism for participation in 
representative democracy is the electoral contest. Since this is well known, 
I will focus instead on two democratic innovations that epitomise par-
ticipatory and deliberative practices, namely: participatory budgeting and 
mini-publics.
 Representative Democracy
In representative democracy citizens elect candidates periodically in order 
to represent them in institutions and make decisions on their behalf. This 
 understanding was articulated seven decades ago by thinkers such as Schum-
peter (1943), who argued that democracy is about competitive elite politics 
and methods for “selecting leaders, rather than about popular participation in 
politics as such” (Saward, 2003, p. 56). For its advocates then and now, given the 
complexities of governance and policymaking, this seems the most “workable 
form of democracy” (Elstub & McLaverty, 2014, p. 13). From this perspective, 
democratic participation is about citizens casting votes and allowing repre-
sentatives and officials to get on with the business of governing until the next 
election.
Dahl’s work in the 1950s is a key exponent of the dominant notion of plu-
ralism built on the Schumpeterian narrative of democracy. Dahl (1989b) 
 understood pluralism as the aggregation of citizens’ interests through diverse 
 political parties and interest groups, so that democracy features multiple 
 centres of power and counters authoritarianism. Furthermore, he considered 
this to be the distinguishing feature of modern democratic regimes: “What for 
centuries was held to be the lethal poison of republics, the spirit of faction, 
is in modern democracies institutionalized in parties and interest groups” 
(Dahl,  1982, p. 28). In this pluralist model, the accommodation of difference 
and the  resolution of conflict take place through bargaining and exchange 
amongst the leaders of competing groups (Barber, 2003, p. 144).
The making of publics in representative democracy takes therefore place 
in aggregative fashion. By aggregating the individual preferences of citizens, 
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the goal of electoral participation is to decide what “leaders, rules, and policies 
will best correspond to the most widely and strongly held preferences” (Young, 
2000, p. 19). Accordingly, democracy is a “competitive process” in which politi-
cal parties “attempt to satisfy the largest number of people’s preferences”, and 
publics are constructed on the basis of like-minded citizens organising inter-
est groups in order to “influence the actions of parties and policy-makers once 
they are elected” (Ibid.).
The role of citizens in this conception of democracy is minimalist. They 
are invited to be voters, and as Schumpeter put it, “once they have elected an 
 individual, political action is his business and not theirs” (Saward, 2003, p. 41). 
Therefore, citizens are offered to be mainly “spectators in the game of poli-
tics”, which remains the preserve of political and interest group elites (Dryzek, 
1990, p. 120). It is difficult to overstate the predominance of this way of thinking 
and enacting democracy. Today, in the eyes of many, democracy means mostly 
representative democracy (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002; cf. Neblo, Esterling, 
Kennedy, Lazer, & Sokhey, 2010).
Nonetheless, increasing recognition of the shortcomings of this model 
has opened up space for alternatives that seek to enhance representative 
 democracy by developing new meanings and practices. This has been par-
ticularly driven by the demands of contemporary governance and policymak-
ing. Warren (2009, p. 6) highlights the growing incapacities of representative 
democracy with respect to policy development and implementation. Under 
the standard model, citizens elect representatives to make policy on their be-
half, who then direct administrators to further develop it. However, Warren 
explains, those underpinning linkages are broken by the realities of contem-
porary governance. Firstly, territorial electoral constituencies seldom match 
issue constituencies. Secondly, electoral systems “only roughly reflect citizen 
preferences, and they do so in highly aggregated, information-poor ways”. 
Thirdly,  legislatures have “very low policy-making capacities, and so pass most 
decisions to executives … and agencies”, which are “often left to guess what 
 constituents want”. Finally, bureaucratic forms of policy  development also 
 feature “ inherent limitations” stemming from hierarchical rigidity and enor-
mous technical and political complexity. In this context, policy-makers in-
creasingly “speak the language of trust, collaboration” and citizen engagement 
to compensate “for low global legitimacy of electoral democracy by generating 
legitimacy … issue by issue, policy by policy, and constituency by constituen-
cy” (Warren, 2009, pp. 7–8).
Accordingly, conventional liberal notions of “representative democracy 
plus techno-bureaucratic administration” (Fung & Wright, 2003b, p. 3) are be-
ing challenged on various grounds. For Dalton (2004, p. 1), the main challenge 
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comes from citizens, who seem increasingly “distrustful of politicians,  sceptical 
about democratic institutions, and disillusioned about how the democratic 
process functions”. Furthermore, the intensification of social  complexity, 
coupled with new hierarchies of knowledge and expertise, are deemed to 
contribute to deeper and subtler levels of democratic deficit (Fischer, 2009). 
Putnam (2000) has also illustrated the deterioration of the relational fabric 
of  community life –or “social capital”–arguing that this hinders democratic 
participation.
While some have questioned such narratives of decline by documenting the 
emergence of alternative forms of participation (e.g. Castells, 2012;  Norris, 2002), 
governments and public agencies have nonetheless increased efforts to institu-
tionalise new participatory and deliberative processes (Escobar, 2014, pp. 3–10). 
Accordingly, collaborative governance and public participation  arrangements 
are presented as strategies to counter democratic deficits, deal with complex 
issues, increase problem-solving capacity, foster social capital, and restore 
legitimacy to policy-making processes (Callon, Lascoumes, & Barthe, 2009; 
De Souza Briggs, 2008; Fischer, 2000). Indeed, representative  democracy 
has been increasingly infused with ideas and practices of  participatory 
democracy.
 Participatory Democracy
Although debates about participatory democracy can be traced back to Athe-
nian democracy, the narratives highlighted here were shaped in the past 
 century. For example, Dewey was a strong critic of the “democratic elitism” 
that underpins mainstream narratives of representative democracy (Bern-
stein, 2010, p. 74). He saw elitism as central to the demise of democracy and 
the advance of elite-driven populism and totalitarian regimes (Dewey, 1937, 
p. 467):
Everywhere there are waves of criticism and doubt as to whether democ-
racy can meet pressing problems … Wherever it has fallen, [democracy] 
had not become part of the bone and blood of the people in daily con-
duct of its life. Democratic forms were limited to Parliament, elections 
and combats between parties. What is happening proves conclusively, I 
think, that unless democratic habits of thought and action are part of 
the fiber of a people, political democracy is insecure. It can not stand in 
isolation. It must be buttressed by the presence of democratic methods 
in all social relationships.
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Dewey understood democracy as more than a form of government. He saw it 
as a way of life and placed at its heart “the necessity for the participation of 
every mature human being in formation of the values that regulate the living 
of [people] together”, thus arguing that this is “necessary from the standpoint 
of both the general social welfare and the full development of human beings 
as individuals” (Dewey, 1937, p. 457). The revival of this participatory idea of de-
mocracy started in the 1960s (e.g. Pateman, 1970). It can be broadly defined as a 
form of democracy that enables extensive participation of citizens in ongoing 
decision-making, whether it is at national or local level, or within communi-
ties or organisations (Saward, 2003, p. 149). Whereas representative democracy 
leaves politics to specialists and experts, participatory democracy compels citi-
zens to encounter other citizens without intermediaries, and therefore politics 
is seen as the art of participating in planning, coordinating and enacting col-
lective futures (Barber, 2003, pp. 152, 153).
Participatory democrats come in many stripes, but they share a critique 
of the aggregation-based logic of pluralism in representative democracy 
( Barber, 2003; Hirst, 1990, pp. 38–56; Mouffe, 1992; Pateman, 1970). That is, 
they argue that aggregating citizens’ preferences through interest groups and 
 political parties alone may look neutral but “in practice supports and serves 
the powerful”, that is, those most capable of mobilising resources to support 
their interests (Dryzek, 2010, p. 91). Their contention is that this can sub-
sume or ignore difference and conflict, resulting in the exclusion of citizens, 
values and perspectives –especially those of marginalised and oppressed 
groups. Accordingly, participatory democrats start from the  recognition 
that there are multiple legitimate ways of being, experiencing and shaping 
the world, but they go beyond notions of pluralism where that multiplic-
ity is to be aggregated through competition rather than  engaged through 
participation.
For instance, radical pluralists like Mouffe (1996, p. 246) argue that plural-
ism is not merely a fact “that we must bear grudgingly or try to reduce”.  Instead, 
she advocates a pluralism that “gives a positive status to differences and re-
fuses the objective of unanimity and homogeneity which is always revealed 
as fictitious and based on acts of exclusion” (Ibid.). Nonetheless, she criticises 
“extreme pluralism” that uncritically values all differences, and proposes limits 
because there are certain differences that are “constructed as relations of sub-
ordination and should therefore be challenged” (Mouffe, 1996, p. 247). From 
this perspective, to engage across their differences, citizens should ideally 
embrace a “democratic attitude that converts antagonism into agonism, fight-
ing into critical engagement, enemies into adversaries who are treated with 
 respect” (Dryzek, 2010, p. 92).
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The notion of pluralism that traverses different versions of participatory de-
mocracy chimes well with James’ calls for critical engagement with different 
viewpoints and worldviews. His “engaged pluralism” eschews the relativism 
of incommensurable frameworks and paradigms, and demands that citizens 
“reach out to the points of contact where we can critically engage with each 
other” (Bernstein, 2010, p. 62). Accordingly, participatory democrats dispute 
the idea that conflict is intractable and can only be addressed through aggre-
gation, competition, bargaining and toleration. Instead, they propose “a poli-
tics that can transform conflict into cooperation through citizen participation, 
public deliberation, and civic education” (Barber, 2003, p. 135).
If representative democracy imagines ‘the public’ as forming itself through 
electoral contests and interest group dynamics, participatory democracy imag-
ines a multiplicity of publics developed through processes of collective asso-
ciation, collaboration, struggle and civic education. For Dewey (1927, pp. 131, 
137, 142), the ‘general public’ is a potentially paralysing abstraction. Only when 
publics are assembled around specific issues, and embodied locally, they 
can become democratic agents: “We lie … in the lap of an immense intelli-
gence. But that intelligence is dormant and its communications are broken, 
inarticulate and faint until it possesses the local community as its medium” 
(Dewey, 1927, p. 219). Participatory democrats have since emphasised ‘the lo-
cal’ as the key site for democratic participation (e.g. Barber, 2003; De Souza 
Briggs, 2008). This entails decentralisation and devolution of power across 
social and policy worlds. For instance, in Hirst’s vision (1997, p. 64), a “plural-
ist state” would exist to “protect and serve the self-governing associations”. 
 Accordingly, participatory democrats have often emphasised extending partic-
ipation in  decision-making to other processes and institutions in society –e.g. 
workplaces, family– and not just the state (Dryzek, 1990, p. 220; Pateman, 1970). 
This stems from the view that social and economic equality are important to 
democracy, alongside “ narrower views of political equality” based on voting 
rights (Saward, 2003, p. 72).
The kind of citizen that citizens are invited to be in participatory democ-
racy departs considerably from the minimalist role offered by the Schumpe-
terian model of representative democracy. Nonetheless, critics often point 
out that taking on this enhanced role may be too much to ask of citizens. A 
century ago, Lippman (1927, pp. 54–55) argued that most citizens are likely 
to be ill-informed, gullible, disinterested, partisan and lacking knowledge, 
creativity and problem-solving capacity. Consequently, his solution was to 
leave politics to leaders and experts. This spurred an emblematic debate 
with Dewey, who counter-argued that “the cure for the ills of democracy was 
a more radical and committed democracy” (Bernstein, 2010, p. 80). Dewey 
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consistently defended his “faith in the capacity of human beings for intel-
ligent judgement and action if the proper conditions are furnished” (quoted 
in  Bernstein, 2010, p. 75).
This developmental understanding of citizen participation became a de-
fining feature of participatory democracy. For instance, Pateman (1970, p. 43) 
emphasised that participation not only produced outputs in the form of poli-
cies and decisions, but also generated educative effects that contributed to 
the “development of the social and political capacities of each individual”. 
This highlights two important dimensions in participatory democracy. On 
the one hand, the sense of efficacy that can be developed by citizens “taking 
advantage of opportunities for genuine participation in decisions affecting 
their lives” (Saward, 2003, p. 71). On the other, the view that citizens are not 
“ pre-packed bundles of fixed preferences and fixed propensities” but they 
have potential that can be “nurtured and shaped, for their benefit and for 
that of their  societies” (Saward, 2003, p. 72). The Lippman/Dewey debate is 
still very much alive today, as anyone involved in developing engagement 
processes knows too well (see Escobar, 2014, pp. 213–241). However, practices 
of participatory  democracy, despite pitfalls and shortcomings, demonstrate 
that citizens can be capable problem-solvers and policymakers (De Souza 
Briggs, 2008; Fischer, 2000, 2009; Fung, 2004; Fung & Wright, 2003a; Smith, 
2009).
The ideals of participatory democracy have informed the mushrooming of 
engagement processes across the world (e.g. www.participedia.net). An em-
blematic exemplar of the translation of those ideals into institutional practices 
is the case of participatory budgeting (pb). pb originated in the Brazilian city 
of Porto Alegre in the late 1980s, when the newly elected government of the 
Workers Party sought to develop mechanisms for citizen participation in local 
governance. This was to fulfil their “pro-poor” electoral commitment (Smith, 
2009, p. 35), as well as break with decades of generalised political patronage 
and civic dissatisfaction with representative institutions in Brazilian political 
life (Baiocchi, 2005, pp. 9–13). pb is a democratic innovation based on a simple 
idea: involving citizens in making decisions about public expenditure.
The Porto Alegre process entails a series of periodic assemblies over several 
months at neighbourhood, district and municipal levels (for an overview see 
Smith, 2009, p. Chapter 2). Citizens set local priorities at the popular assem-
blies and then send delegates to the strategic committees, where they work 
with public officials to make decisions regarding the distribution of resourc-
es. Then, the mayor takes the budget to the legislature for formal approval 
( Baiocchi, 2005, p. 9). The evaluations of the first decade of pb in Porto Alegre 
highlighted the challenges of introducing this participatory mechanism in the 
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face of existing administrative and community activist cultures, but they also 
noted its remarkable achievements regarding improvements for the poorest 
areas in a city with over 1.3 million citizens (see for instance Baiocchi, 2005; 
Sintomer & Gret, 2005; Wampler, 2007). As Baiocchi (2005, p. 14) explains, up 
to 21% of a budget that in 2001 was u.s.$610 million was allocated through pb 
to hundreds of projects that
have contributed to an increase to almost full coverage in sewage and wa-
ter, a threefold increase in the number of children in municipal schools, 
and significant increases in the number of new housing units provided 
to needy families. Porto Alegre’s expenditures on certain areas, such as 
health and housing, are much higher than the national average, and the 
municipality has tended over the years to spend less in administrative 
costs.
In 2001, over 16,600 citizens were taking part in pb (Smith, 2009, p. 1). Remark-
ably, pb succeeded in attracting “broad-based participation from the poorer 
strata of Porto Alegre’s citizenry” –with women, ethnic minorities, and low in-
come and low education participants being overrepresented when compared 
to the city’s population– and proved successful in “effectively linking that 
participation to redistributive outcomes” (Baiocchi, 2005, pp. 14–15). pb soon 
became a signature policy of the Workers Party across Brazil, although other 
parties have sometimes kept it when taking power (Wampler, 2007). Inspired 
by the 2001 World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, activists and political entre-
preneurs took the idea and tried, with variable fortune, to adapt it in other 
countries (Röcke, 2013). Since then, pb has reached global diffusion with thou-
sands of processes across the globe, although it is important to note that pb 
has become a popular label sometimes attached to processes that bear little 
 resemblance to the emancipatory Porto Alegre model (Baiocchi & Ganuza, 
2014).
 Deliberative Democracy
Since the 1990s, deliberative theory and practice have built on, and rekindled, 
some of the ideals of participatory democracy (for an overview see Elstub, 
2010). Indeed, deliberative democracy shares much with its participatory 
counterpart. The distinguishing feature, however, is its emphasis on commu-
nication as the key dimension in democratic participation. This discursive 
focus is underpinned by the claim that “political decision-making should be 
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 talk-centric rather than voter-centric” (Elstub & McLaverty, 2014, p. 1). Delib-
erative democrats also highlight the inadequacy of “aggregative conceptions”, 
arguing that democracy is more than just counting heads: “it must involve dis-
cussion on an equal and inclusive basis, which deepens participants’ knowl-
edge of issues, awareness of the interests of others, and the confidence to play 
an active part in public affairs” (Saward, 2000, p. 5).
Democracy is thus seen not as “a market for the exchange of private prefer-
ences” but as a discursive forum for the exchange of public reasons and the cre-
ation of public agreements (Parkinson, 2004, p. 379). Ideally, in that forum, “no 
force except that of the better argument is exercised” (Habermas, 1975, p. 108; 
for a critique see Shapiro, 1999), and there is room for reasons and emotions 
through inclusive communication dynamics that enable diverse forms of ex-
pression, argumentation and reciprocity (Escobar, 2011; Morrell, 2010; Young, 
2000). Crucially, deliberation entails “communication that induces reflection 
on preferences, values and interests in a non-coercive fashion” (Mansbridge et 
al., 2010, p. 65). The goal is to facilitate conversations that generate
reasonable, well-informed opinions in which participants are willing to 
revise preferences in light of discussion, new information, and claims 
made by fellow participants. Although consensus need not be the ulti-
mate aim of deliberation, and participants are expected to pursue their 
interests, an overarching interest in the legitimacy of outcomes (under-
stood as justification to all affected) ideally characterizes deliberation.
chambers, 2003, p. 309
In other words, participants make decisions not by counting what prefer-
ences have greater numerical support but “by determining which proposals 
the collective agrees are supported by the best reasons” (Young, 2000, p. 23). 
Therefore, deliberative democrats argue that “public deliberation of free and 
equal citizens” is the core of legitimate decision-making and self-government 
(Bohman, 1998, p. 401). Moreover, they claim that “deliberation improves the 
quality and acceptability of collective decisions” (Saward, 2003, p. 147).
The notion of pluralism that underpins deliberative democracy builds on 
the engaged pluralism previously explored but, again, places further empha-
sis on the role of discourse in consensus-building. In Table 1, I used the label 
‘discursive pluralism’ to capture the deliberative democrat’s assumption that 
difference and disagreement can be not only expressed but also actively ad-
dressed through dialogue and deliberation (Escobar, 2011, pp. 38–44). As 
 Dryzek (2010, p. 93) notes, many pluralist schools agree that pluralism is both 
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valuable and problematic, and they “see communication across difference as 
key to resolution”.
Accordingly, Schlosberg (2008, p. 149) argues that, even if incommensura-
ble, values and beliefs can be shared, or at least  understood, across differences. 
However, it is crucial that, echoing earlier references to agonism,  addressing 
conflict does not translate into the dismissal of diversity (Schlosberg, 2008, 
p. 150). To deal with this careful balance, deliberative democrats prize reciproc-
ity, which means that “citizens must provide reasons in terms that those with 
whom they disagree can accept” (Dryzek, 2010, p. 102; Gutmann & Thompson, 
1996). Therefore, discursive pluralism implies that difference and disagree-
ment can be productively engaged through deliberation insofar they are 
communicated in terms that others may recognise as legitimate. Although 
deliberative democracy often strives for consensus, it acknowledges the inevi-
tability of conflict and the desirability of difference. From this perspective, the 
key to conflict resolution is “the reconstruction of private or partial interests 
into publicly defensible norms” through sustained deliberation (Barber, 2003, 
p. 135; Dryzek, 1990, p. 124).
Deliberative democracy pays considerable attention to how publics are 
made. It does not treat ‘the public’ as a given, but emphasises that publics 
should be developed by engaging citizens with diverse beliefs, values and 
views in dialogue and deliberation with others. This is a response to the 
 challenge –also levelled against participatory democracy– that most citizens 
cannot realistically be well informed on public issues, and therefore are inca-
pable of considered judgement on matters of policy and governance. Delib-
erative democracy seeks to transform citizens’ possibly uninformed views and 
preferences through open and inclusive discussion –in contrast to aggregative 
electoral procedures that merely register those views and preferences uncriti-
cally (Saward, 2003, p. 121).
In deliberative democracy, publics are therefore made through deliberation 
that transforms private preferences through the discipline of justification  –
that is, deliberators must offer public reasons in support of their alternative 
ideas about what constitutes the common good in the pursuit of policies and 
decisions. Public deliberation is thus an open arena for testing ideas, evidence 
and arguments on their own merits –in contrast to the power dynamics of in-
terest group bargaining.
Diversity and inclusion are crucial to robust public deliberation. Accord-
ingly, demographic diversity plays an important role in ensuring that delib-
erative processes involve a range of citizens across the social and economic 
spectrum –e.g. age, gender, ethnicity, income, education. This has been termed 
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by Phillips (1995) as the “politics of presence”, and the argument is that de-
mographic diversity can help to ensure that a variety of perspectives and ex-
periences are represented in deliberation. However, to avoid the essentialism 
of assuming that citizens with certain demographic characteristics can in any 
way be representative of a particular social group, deliberative democrats are 
increasingly placing emphasis on discursive diversity (see Dryzek & Niemeyer, 
2010). This means including a variety of discourses, that is, worldviews, beliefs, 
values and ideas articulated through communication. This is based on the idea 
that a forum that includes 100 participants who are demographically diverse, 
but actually think and talk similarly, is arguably less diverse –from a delibera-
tive perspective– than a forum with 10 participants who actually express very 
different viewpoints and worldviews.
The kind of citizen that citizens are invited to be in deliberative settings is 
that of informed deliberator engaged in sense-making, problem-solving and 
considered judgement. This shares participatory democracy’s belief in the 
potential of all citizens to engage meaningfully with public affairs. But it also 
emphasises that the capacity and competence for considered judgement is not 
only developed through mere participation, but through engagement in com-
munication that features deliberative qualities. For instance, participating in 
processes that only bring together like-minded people may not foster the kind 
of exposure to difference and disagreement that deliberative democrats argue 
can be transformative (e.g. Mutz, 2006; Sunstein, 2009). The learning and shap-
ing of ideas that takes place in inclusive deliberative interaction is, in this view, 
crucial to develop the kind of informed judgement needed for making public 
policies and collective decisions.
In practice, deliberative democracy can be understood at a macro or a micro 
level. The former concerns the “public sphere”, which is a space –distinct from 
the state and the market– for political engagement through discursive interac-
tion (Fraser, 1990, p. 57). This includes the “ebb and flow of public debate car-
ried on in the media, in private conversations, in formal and informal settings, 
from pubs to parliaments and back again” (Parkinson, 2004, p. 380; Parkinson 
& Mansbridge, 2012). In turn, the micro level focuses on forums and processes 
emerging at the interface between official and public spheres. Most thinking 
and experimentation regarding deliberative practices has taken place at this 
micro level. In particular, one democratic innovation –mini-publics– has seen 
continuous development over the last two decades. In the remainder of this 
section I introduce mini-publics to illustrate how deliberative ideas have been 
translated into practices.
The idea of mini-publics was first proposed four decades ago by Dahl (1989a, 
p. 342) as a mechanism for involving citizens in dealing with public issues. He 
called it ‘minipopulus’: an assembly of citizens, demographically  representative 
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of the larger population, brought together to learn and deliberate on a topic 
in order to inform public opinion and decision making. A growing number 
of democratic innovations have proliferated globally based on this idea, from 
citizens’ juries, to planning cells, consensus conferences, deliberative polls and 
citizen assemblies (for overviews Elstub, 2014; Smith, 2009, pp. 72–110). They 
have been used to deal with topics ranging from constitutional and electoral 
reform, to controversial science and technology, and myriad social and policy 
issues (e.g. health, justice, planning, sectarianism).
Mini-publics are typically made up of quasi-randomly selected citizens, for 
instance, chosen by lot from the electoral roll or a similar proxy for the relevant 
population. The principle is that everyone affected by the topic in question has 
an equal chance of being selected, and this underpins the arguments that can 
then be made about its legitimacy (Carson & Martin, 1999). Stratified random 
sampling is typically used to ensure the inclusion of a range of demographic 
characteristics from the broader population. The purpose is to assemble a mi-
crocosm of ‘the public’, a mini-public. They vary in size from around twenty par-
ticipants in citizens’ juries to hundreds in deliberative polls. Therefore, smaller 
mini-publics cannot be representative but still aim to be demographically di-
verse (Hendriks, 2005, p. 96). The process usually has at least three stages:
• Learning phase. Participants are supported to learn about the topic by scru-
tinising evidence, views and testimonies presented, for instance, by experts, 
officials, activists and relevant stakeholders. A Stewarding Board usually 
oversees the process to ensure that the information and opinion provided 
are balanced and reflect the variety of perspectives on the issue.
• Deliberative phase. Aided by impartial facilitators, participants then engage 
in small group deliberation where they reconsider their initial views and 
preferences on the topic in the light of the evidence and testimonies from 
the learning phase, but also with respect to the arguments and experiences 
of their fellow deliberators.
• Decision-making phase. Depending on the topic and type of mini-public, 
this leads to a particular recommendation or decision articulated in a final 
report or statement. That is the case in consensus-oriented mini-publics 
such as citizens’ juries, consensus conferences and citizens’ assemblies. In 
research-oriented mini-publics, such as deliberative polls, the aim is not 
consensus, but measuring through pre- and post- surveys how citizens’ pref-
erences may change through learning and deliberation.
Mini-publics offer an innovative way of answering a fundamental question: 
How would citizens deal with a given issue if they had the time and resources to 
learn and deliberate about it in order to reach an informed decision?  Evidence 
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from mini-publics consistently suggests that, when given time and resources 
to learn and deliberate, citizens can come to grips with complex issues and 
produce considered recommendations (Elstub, 2014; Grönlund, Bächtiger, & 
Setälä, 2014; Roberts & Escobar, 2015). This section concludes with a snapshot 
of an emblematic mini-public.
When the issue of electoral reform gained momentum in British Columbia 
(Canada), the government adopted an unusual approach. Instead of leaving it 
to political parties –with clear vested interests in the issue– they tasked citi-
zens with reviewing the electoral system and, if judged necessary, propose a 
new one. Accordingly, the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral 
Reform was formed in 2004, including 160 randomly selected citizens. There 
were one man and woman –across a range of ages– for each of the 79 elec-
toral districts, plus two Aboriginal participants. Assembly participants were 
given a stipend for their work. The process involved several weekend assem-
bly sessions over 10 months, and public hearings hosted by the participants 
in their local communities. The Assembly went through learning, deliberative 
and  decision-making stages, and produced a final recommendation to the 
 British Columbia legislature. The proposal for the Assembly’s preferred elec-
toral system was then put to the citizenry through a referendum. In the end, 
the proposal received considerable public support (57%) but missed by 3% 
the required threshold. To this day, and alongside subsequent constitutional 
assemblies in Ontario,  Netherlands and Ireland, this case remains one of the 
most ambitious attempts to embody deliberative ideals in a new type of demo-
cratic institution (Fournier, van der Kolk, & Carty, 2011; Warren & Pearse, 2008).
 Conclusions: A Vibrant Ecology of Participation Practices
Prominent post-war theorists constructed a narrative of democracy that em-
phasised leadership, competition, aggregation and minimalist citizenship. This 
understanding of representative democracy became so influential that many 
subsequent scholars felt no need to justify it. Indeed, it became the mainstream 
narrative, and the benchmark by which democracy was to be understood, 
measured and analysed. Accordingly, as Saward (2003, pp. 42–47) explains, im-
portant ideological assumptions were built into that narrative and presented 
as mere descriptions of the ‘reality’ of democratic politics. Amongst the critics 
of this narrative, however, were participatory democrats who since the 1960s 
rekindled the pre-war ashes of Dewey’s vision for democracy and participa-
tion. Participatory democracy grew, in theory and practice, thus permeating 
mainstream narratives with strong arguments about pluralism,  inclusion, and 
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citizen empowerment and education. Since the 1990s, deliberative democrats 
built on participatory ideals, but also developed distinct normative and practi-
cal dimensions around the communicative fabric of democracy.
In the last two decades, there have been robust theoretical and empirical 
critiques of participatory and deliberative democracy, and the challenges of 
turning ideals into practices have become apparent. This has rekindled de-
bates over whether citizens are willing and capable to participate and deliber-
ate (e.g. Fischer, 2000; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002; Neblo et al., 2010); how to 
ensure inclusion and diversity, and their effects on group dynamics (e.g. Mutz, 
2006; Sunstein, 2009; Young, 2000); whether participation and deliberation are 
feasible in the face of interest-based politics (e.g. Forester, 1988; Hendriks, 2011; 
Shapiro, 1999); whether participatory processes seek enrolment and co-option 
rather than empowerment (e.g. Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Cornwall & Coelho, 
2007); whether emancipatory practices are giving way to technocratic or de-
politicised participatory processes (Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2017; Lee, 2015); and 
the challenge of scaling up deliberation to develop large deliberative systems 
(Parkinson & Mansbridge, 2012).
In isolation, none of the three models sketched here are fully satisfactory. 
Representative democracy, as shown earlier, can be an easy target for criti-
cism. However, as Saward (1998, p. 64) argues, participatory and deliberative 
democracy can’t fully substitute representative democracy, and indeed they 
often require aggregative mechanisms for resolution and decision-making. 
Nonetheless, participatory budgeting and mini-publics are good examples of 
how different understandings of democracy can coalesce into one process that 
involves participation, deliberation and voting –the core constitutive practices 
of the three models. Accordingly, these practices can be combined in produc-
tive ways. For instance, voting after a deliberative process can combine two im-
portant democratic goods: informed and considered decision-making through 
deep deliberation, and legitimate decision-making through large-scale expres-
sion of popular preferences using the ballot.
Therefore, these three ways of understanding democracy overlap and can 
be enacted in complementary ways by combining and sequencing their con-
stitutive practices. However, it is important to acknowledge their distinctive-
ness. For example, there can be deliberative democracy without participatory 
democracy and vice versa. Deliberation can take place amongst political or 
policy elites (e.g. Steiner, 2004), which is normatively desirable but doesn’t ful-
fil broader participatory ideals of inclusion. By the same token, participation 
can take place without deliberation, for instance, when citizens engage only 
with the like-minded, interact on the basis of interest-based bargaining, or 
take part in protests and boycotts. All of these are of course legitimate courses 
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of action in democratic life. But the point is that these different forms of par-
ticipation can play different functions, and therefore their combination may 
offer new options that realise a broader range of democratic goods. This is 
 exemplified in the case of participatory budgeting noted earlier on –with citi-
zens and elected representatives engaging in both aggregative and deliberative 
modes of collective decision-making as part of a process that mobilises people 
to generate legitimacy, inclusion, transparency, scrutiny and problem-solving. 
Nonetheless, at the moment, elitist narratives of representative democracy can 
too easily overhaul participatory and deliberative counter-narratives in prac-
tice ( Escobar, 2014, pp. 213–242). This much has been learned from ambitious 
processes like the crowd-sourcing of the new Icelandic constitution, halted in 
the end by political and interest group elites (Gylfason, 2013).
These models encompass not only different understandings of democracy, 
but also different democratic aspirations. Therefore, there may be a sense of 
incompatibility if we simply focus on the ideas and assumptions that under-
pin them –i.e. the different conceptions of the role of citizens (see Table  1). 
 However, if we focus on practices and mechanisms, then combination seems 
feasible –i.e. political parties could be more participative, and interest groups 
could engage more deliberatively. Accordingly, there seems to be potential to 
develop a representative democracy that is more participatory and deliberative 
in its mechanisms, and where elections, political parties and interest groups 
are only one part of a more vibrant ecology of democratic participation. The 
challenge ahead is to imagine how these three ways of thinking about democ-
racy can be brought together by combining their core practices to enrich po-
litical life and co-create better collective futures. The confluence of these three 
models was already implicit in Dewey’s (1916, p. 1542) vision a century ago: “A 
democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associ-
ated living, of conjoint communicated experience”.
Although democracy and pluralism go hand in hand, I have shown that 
their relationship is not straightforward. Both are normative ideas that have 
evolved through creativity, contestation and practice. Democracy can be seen 
as a result of, and a response to, pluralism: a way of organising society by build-
ing enough common ground –social norms and institutional rules– to enable 
the respect of differences and their role in articulating, contesting and reart-
iculating competing ideas of the common good. Pluralists like Connolly (2005) 
have offered agonistic notions of pluralism that emphasise the acceptance, 
respect and value of the worldviews, beliefs and positions of others. However, 
as shown earlier, the way this translates into democratic practices varies. In Re-
scher’s (1993, p. 5) view, the pluralist accepts that “dissensus” is unavoidable in 
a complex world, and works to “make the world safe for disagreement” and to 
assemble processes that “make dissensus tolerable if not actually productive”.
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Here is where returning to James’ engaged pluralism provides a useful foun-
dation for democratic participation. As Bernstein (2010, p. 69) explains, James 
warned against reification, that is, “the dangers of thinking that groups have 
fixed identities”, for he was “acutely aware of how identities change, develop, 
and mutate”. Consequently, he was critical about “blindly celebrating differenc-
es” and just as concerned with “searching for commonalities that can bind us 
together”. The evolving nature of pluralism has subsequently been emphasised 
by agonistic thinkers who explore “the constitutive tension between already 
existing diversity and the politics of becoming by which new constituencies 
struggle to modify the register of legitimate diversity” (Connolly, 2005, p. 69). 
Consequently, pluralists encourage “a move away from thinking of diversity 
in terms of individual beliefs” because difference is “both socially constructed 
and collective” and thus pluralism is always in the making (Schlosberg, 2008, 
p. 152). As James (2004, p. 53) put it, “knowledge of sensible realities thus comes 
to life inside the tissue of experience. It is made; and made by relations that 
unroll themselves in time”. For James, the “relations” that enable and shape 
“knowledge of sensible realities” are made possible by exposure to difference 
and disagreement. He embraced “the need to see alternatives and imagine 
other states of mind” (Schlosberg, 2008, p. 150).
This warrants a call for participatory processes, physical and virtual, where 
citizens can meaningfully engage with those who are different from them –
those “others” that can be easily dismissed or despised when they remain 
faceless stereotypes (Escobar, 2011, p. 23). The absence of such forums in the 
public sphere can have profound consequences because a lack opportunities 
to be exposed to, and challenged by, difference, can diminish citizens’ capac-
ity for engaged pluralism (e.g. Sunstein, 2009), and the narrower pluralism of 
 elite-driven democracy may seem the only option. According to Dewey (1937, 
p. 467), that option that does little to ensure the sustainability and develop-
ment of democracy: “unless democratic habits of thought and action are part 
of the fiber of a people, political democracy is insecure”. From this perspec-
tive, elitism and populism can be seen as two sides of the same coin –one 
 predicated on the creation of committed followership, rather than engaged 
citizenship. In this sense, the future of democracy may depend greatly on the 
kind of  citizen that citizens are invited and enabled to be.
Thinkers who argue that politics should mean more than party politics, 
and democracy more than representative democracy, have convincingly ques-
tioned the Schumpeterian narrative that prevailed in the last century. Current 
developments in participatory and deliberative democracy seem promising in 
terms of deepening citizenship, developing collective problem-solving capac-
ity, and creating public spaces for engaged pluralism. New meanings and prac-
tices of democracy are, as ever, in the making.
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